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Abstract
In the United States, the relationship between state governments and public colleges and universities is being
redefined with new notions of autonomy and accountability, and with funding policies that are highly market-
driven (often referred to as "privatisation") as the centerpieces. Situations and institutional strategies
unthinkable only a few years ago are becoming increasingly commonplace. For instance, a few business and
law schools at public institutions are moving toward privatisation, distancing themselves from both the states
and their parent universities.
While American higher education has traditionally been competitive and market driven, emerging state
market-based policies, which will clearly benefit some types of institutions over others, are further
intensifying the competition with a variety of effects at the institutional and sector levels. Entrepreneurial or
commercial activities may provide the additional resources individual institutions need to fulfil their public
purpose. However, when all institutions pursue the same set of competitive strategies, no one gains an
advantage. Institutions run harder to stay in place. The cumulative effect of competition may also work against
important social objectives such as affordability and access. This paper explores the challenges that the current
competitive environment creates for institutional leaders in the United States. It acknowledges that the
competitive environment will not abate and suggests that by competing in different ways, over different
objectives, with different purposes, US higher education might better meet its social objectives of increased
access, lower cost and enhanced quality.
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In the United States, the relationship betiueen state governments and public
colleges and universities is being redefined with new notions of autonomy
and accountability, and with/unding policies that are highly marfeet-driuen
(often referred to as "priuatisation") as the centrepieces. Situations and
institutional strategies unthinkable only a few years ago are becoming
increasingly commonplace. For instance, a few business and lau; schools at
public institutions are mouing toward priuatisation, distancing themselues
from both the states and their parent uniuersities.
While American higher education has traditionally been competitiue and
market driven, emerging state marfeet-based policies, which will clearly
benefit some types of institutions ouer others, are further intensifying the
competition with a uariety of effects at the institutional and sector leuels.
Entrepreneurial or commercial actiuities may prouide the additional
resources indiuidual institutions need to fulfil their public purpose. Howeuer,
when all institutions pursue the same set of competitiue strategies, no one
gains an aduantage. Institutions run harder to stay in place. The cumulatiue
ejject o/competition may also worfe against important social objectiues such
as a^ordability and access. This paper explores the challenges that the
current competitiue enuironment creates for institutional leaders in the
United States. It acfenowledges that the competitiue environment will not
abate and suggests that by competing in different ways, over different
objectiues, with different purposes, US higher education might better meet
its social objectiues qf increased access, lower cost and enhanced quality.
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f hile American higher education has traditionally been competitive and
market driven, numerous challenges are further intensifying competition
among similar and dissimilar colleges and universities, with a variety of
effects on individual institutions and on higher education as a whole. Fiscal
constraints, public policies that foster a greater role for market forces,
changing levels of demand, and the increase in direct and indirect competitors
exacerbate competition and push institutions to pursue strategies they believe
will best position them in the competitive marketplace, such as using merit-
based aid to recruit highly desirable students, hiring faculty "stars" and
investing in high-cost amenities, such as residence halls, improved
information technology infrastructure, wired classrooms and recreational
facilities. Each of these investments has the potential for positive returns
- better-prepared students, improved institutional quality, or the ability to
leverage additional resources or opportunities. However, when institutions
pursue the same set of strategies, no one gains a competitive advantage;
institutions continue to invest, but since most are doing the same thing, they
negate their investments. The cumulative effect is, in many ways, working
against important social objectives, such as affordability and access.
This paper explores the challenges that the current competitive
environment creates for institutional leaders in the United States. It is
grounded in the assumption that the competitive environment will not abate
and may in fact become more intense, and argues that by competing in
different ways, over different objectives, with different purposes, US higher
education might better meet its traditional public policy objectives of
increased access, lower cost and enhanced quality. First, it explores
environmental changes that are enhancing competition. Second, it looks at
the competitive dynamics of US higher education. Third, it explores the notion
of competing differently to minimise the potential pitfalls of the increasingly
competitive environment.
The US higher education landscape
Comparatively, US higher education is an enormous sector. The
US Department of Education counts approximately 6 500 postsecondary
institutions in its federal student financial aid programme, including
4 200 colleges and universities that award degrees (US Department of
Education, 2003). Those 6 500 institutions enrol 14 million students in
78 HIGHER EDUCATION MANAGEMENT AND POLICY - VOLUME 19, No. 1 - ISSN 1682-3451 - ® OEGD 2007
REDEFINING COMPETITION CONSTRUCTIVELY..
undergraduate degrees programmes, with the remaining 2 million students
enrolled in graduate programmes. Approximately 1100 of these institutions
are public two-year colleges, enrolling the largest share of undergraduates
(6 million). There are 630 public four-year colleges and universities that enrol
6.2 million undergraduate and graduate students. Slightly more than
1 900 private, non-profit (or independent) colleges and universities enrol
3.2 million students. The remaining 2 400 institutions are for-profit, private,
enrolling approximately 750 000 students.
These colleges and universities are funded by a variety of means,
although tuition and fees (which include individual, family or employer
money, but also government-backed financial aid that students use to pay
tuition), and state government appropriations for the public institutions are
most important. These two sources - along with local government
appropriations for community colleges and federal research grants and
contracts at research universities - provide the majority of funding for
institutional general operating expenses. However, other sources of funding
are important and increasingly so, including private gifts, returns from
endowment investments, and revenue from various enterprises, licensing
agreements and services. For the most part, US colleges and universities
pursue an intentionally diversified set of revenue streams (Heam, 2003).
Competition throughout higher education for students and their tuition
dollars can be fierce in this market underwritten by more than USD 105 billion
(2002/03) in available financial aid (including USD 71 billion in federal grants,
loans and tax credits; USD 6 billion in state grants, and USD 20 billion in
grants provided by colleges and universities, as well as private organisations)
(College Board, 2003). Most students have multiple choices when selecting a
college or university in which to enrol. While competition for students can
spur improvements and innovation and keep institutions focused on meeting
student needs, it can also have negative effects. Institutions may make
academic and financial choices that may improve the recruitment of certain
types of students (e.g. highly talented, wealthy or athletic), but impede their
ability to do other things, such as serve low-income but qualified students or
adult students.
To further complicate the competition over students, 20 states will see a
decline in the number of projected high school graduates by 2017/18 (Western
Interstate Commission for Higher Education, 2003). States such as Louisiana,
Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota and Wyoming are predicted to see
steep drops on the order of between 10 and 35%. That said, other states such
as Nevada and Arizona have projected tremendous growth (103% in Nevada
for example and 55% in Arizona), and other Western and Southern states will
see increases of between 25 and 50%. These demographic trends mean that in
some instances, institutions will be starved for prospective students, yet in
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Other states capacity may be taxed to such an extent that students less
prepared and less able to pay their way may be closed out of postsecondary
education entirely, relegated to institutions of marginal quality, or
concentrated in institutions where they will not receive the attention they will
need to succeed.
Beyond tuition and fees, the other primary source of funding, particularly
for the public institutions, is state appropriations. Depending upon the
mission and complexity of the institution, this can range tremendously from
well over 60% to less than 10% of the institution's revenue. However, public
moneys are playing a smaller and smaller part in institutions' financial
portfolios. According to Kane, Orzag and Gunter (2003), funding for higher
education has dropped from 7.2% of overall state expenditures in 1977 to 5.3%
of state expenditures in 2000. They argue that if funding had remained
constant at 1977 levels, higher education would have gained an additional
USD 21 billion. As a percentage of institutional revenue, state funding has also
declined, from 46.5% in 1977 to 35.9% in 1996 (Kane, Orzag and Gunter, 2003).
Furthermore, the future financial outlook for all 50 states looks bleak. Recent
data suggest that no state will have a surplus in baseline revenues, and
29 states will face a gap of 5% or more (Jones, 2006). These predicted shortfalls
are due to insufficient tax revenue as economic growth and sales and excise
taxes do not keep pace with demand for governmental programmes and
services; increased spending, mostly due to Medicaid growth; and reduction in
federal grants to states.
Changing state relationships
Many states are changing not only the way they fund public higher
education, but some are developing (and many others are considering) new
policies that affect their broader relationships with public colleges and
universities. Gharter colleges, tuition deregulation, state enterprise status,
public corporations and restructuring are all terms that describe various
policies being implemented in a range of states including Golorado, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Ohio, Texas and Virginia. Each reflects a combination of
changing fiscal and regulatory policies and practices, with particular attention
given to autonomy, accountability and funding. The specifics of each vary, as
does the language, and to complicate matters the terminology is not readily
transparent or used consistently. In some instances, different language refers
to different packages of policies. However, in other situations, similar
language has different meaning in practice. (Gharter colleges in Maryland are
not exactly the same as the chartered university proposal advanced by a
number of universities in Virginia, even though the states are neighbours.)
And different labels can further describe similar policies.
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As a whole, these approaches share some common elements. First, they
refiect a greater market orientation. The effect is a greater reliance on private
dollars and typically the ability to set, keep and invest one's own tuition and
fees. They encourage more entrepreneurial behaviour and the
commercialisation of knowledge. They often provide increased procedural
autonomy and less excessive regulation. The result is enhanced institutional
ability to respond to a changing environment more quickly, to forgo expensive
and burdensome state procedures (such as on capital projects and lease
agreements), and to develop and manage their own operational policies (such
as those regarding human resource issues or procurement). However, these
policies are sometimes accompanied by decreased or fiat public funding. Even
so, some institutions find it appealing to forgo more resources for less
volatility in year-to-year allocations so they may better plan and prepare for
the long term. Finally, these policies typically include additional
accountability requirements that often result in state-set performance
measures. For example, in Virginia, the state outlined a set of 11 goals,
referred to as the "state ask" (Gouturier, in press).
The impact of these changing policies most likely will vary by
institutional mission. Some institutions will benefit from and thus welcome
these policy shifts, particularly those with the reputation and capability to be
entrepreneurial and hold a steady position (or even gain) in the competitive
marketplace. This is not to suggest that the previous environment did not
favour some institutions over others; however, public policy often helped
address the inequities across institutions. Those likely to benefit the most
may be the large, diversified (typically, research) universities that offer a range
of undergraduate, graduate, professional and lifelong leaming programmes;
have sizable auxiliary services that offer products desirable in the
marketplace; can commercialise research or other products and services; and
are able to create and draw upon diverse revenue streams. The majority of
public institutions do not have such capacities, so that the new rules
effectively favour those already most able to compete. Smaller institutions,
community colleges and those that focus predominately on undergraduate
education must often live under the same market-based policies as their
larger counterparts, but have fewer strategies to pursue and fewer resources to
tap. Neither will they be exempted from the heightened standards and
reporting requirements of accountability. At the same time, some
independent (private, non-profit) colleges and universities may welcome
some (but surely not all) of these policy changes, as they might mean easier
access to public dollars and a more level playing field with public institutions.
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Increasingly competitive playing field
Not only are the rules of the game evolving for many US colleges and
universities, but the providers appearing on the competitive playing field are
changing as well. For instance, between 1990 and 2000 the number of private,
for-profit institutions increased by 112% to approximately 750 institutions
(albeit another 200 went out of business) (Hentschke, 2004). And although they
continue to serve a relatively small per cent of students (approximately 5%)
(Kinser, 2006), their growth between 1995 and 2000 increased by 52%, far
outpacing growth in other segments of US higher education (Hentschke, 2004).
They were often touted as the new darlings by Wall Street and even public
policy makers, until recent scandals began to tarnish that image.
Competition from abroad may soon further challenge US higher
education on many levels. For instance regarding research universities, the
Chinese government has set a goal to develop (and fund) 100 world class
universities through its China 211 effort (Zhong, 2006). Another Chinese
government initiative, 985 Project, is providing substantial grants to select
universities the government believes have the greatest potential to compete in
the global academic marketplace (Mohrman, 2005). Peking and Tsinghua
Universities both received CNY 1.8 billion (USD 225 million) in the first round
of that project's funding. Substantial investment like that is bound to have an
impact. Elsewhere, Singapore's minister of education stated his country's
intention to create a "Boston of the East" through its investment in world class
higher education (Altbach, 2000). More recently, the European Union has
expressed plans to create a transnational technological institute on par with
those in the United States, and a primary objective of the Bologna Process is to
create a competitive European higher education sector.
Countries additionally have stepped up their efforts to recruit and
educate international students and the United States has not kept pace
proportionately. For example, Australia has tripled its number of foreign
students since 1990, which is an increase of more than 13-fold since 1980.
United Kingdom institutions have increased the number of foreign students
three-fold since 1990 and four-fold since 1980 (OECD, 2004). Early in this
decade, the US share of the world market stood at 32%, down from a previous
40% (Schneider, 2000). Australian universities have responded by engaging in
multiple strategies (predominately in Asia), one of which is "offshore
education", where students enrol at Australian institutions, but study outside
the country at a foreign partner's campus. In 2000, approximately one-third of
the estimated 100 000 international students enrolled in Australian higher
education were outside of Australia (Davis et al., 2000).
Online education has further affected competition, adding to the mix not
only for-profit institutions or distance learning providers from abroad, but
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traditional institutions that are now located no more than a "click" away.
Geographic locations are less important thanks to technology. A student can
easily choose a math course offered online by another geographically distant
institution over the one at her home institution if the student believes the
competitor's version is better suited to her needs or of higher quality
(Newman et al., 2004).
Finally, public institutions in a single state not only compete with one
another for public dollars, but also must compete with increasingly organised,
independent higher education for public subsidy (Hebel, 2004). For example,
in 2005, independent colleges and universities in New York State received
access to public dollars for capital building projects, much to the chagrin of
their public institution counterparts. However, as an inverse example, private
institutions are seeing their historic domain of private fundraising and gifts
challenged by public institutions. The Chronicle of Higher Education has been
tracking 22 US universities engaged in campaigns to raise USD 1 billion. Of
those 15 institutions are public (see http.//chronicle.com/).
Winner-take-all environment
The above tensions, dynamics, pressures and actors all play themselves
out in the higher education competitive environment described by two
economists as "winner-take-all". Frank and Cook (1995) argue that higher
education operates as a particular type of competitive system in which those at
the top get a disproportional share of rewards. This type of environment places
particular constraints on institutions and creates dynamics that narrow their
options and dictate their strategies. A primary characteristic of this
environment is that small differences in performance translate into large
differences in rewards. In many instances only the "winners" reap the benefits.
Others walk away with nothing to show for their efforts. As an illustration, the
authors describe an auction in which, unlike a traditional auction, not only the
winner placing the highest bid pays, but others who make serious bids
(investments) for the item do as well. However, only one winner (or a few
winners) takes the stakes, disproportionate to the number of those who enter
the game. Furthermore, success is more likely to come to those already
successful or adept at the game, creating even more incentives to reach the top.
The complexities of succeeding in this type of environment are
compounded by the fact that success is determined by relative standing, not
functional or discrete results. For example, institutions strive to be "top ten"
institutions. Not all can be a top ten university, and when demand is dictated
in relative terms only a limited number of institutions can ever succeed.
Because this competitive environment has a limited set of concrete
determinants, institutions invest in surrogates. For example, indicators of
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prestige and status, that might but are not guaranteed to prove beneficial,
become the coins of the realm. Institutions seek the best researchers, try to
field the best athletic teams, recruit the best students and build the most
elaborate research facilities; not in absolute terms, but in relative ones. They
make those investments hoping for the scarce payoff at the end, but risk
gaining little for their efforts if they do not attain one of the few coveted spots
at the top.
The rewards accumulated by those at the top are highly visible and thus
encourage newcomers to get in the game and try to compete on the already
established terms, which they usually do from inferior positions. Frank and
Cook argue that most newcomers overestimate their chances of winning, thus
too many competitors become easily attracted to a situation that will only pay
off for those at the top. When too many contestants participate, they engage
in unproductive patterns of consumption and spending as each tries to "one-
up" the others to gain a competitive advantage. For example, research funding
by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) has increased significantly in the last
decade, leading many universities to see biomedical sciences as a potential
source of support. To succeed, institutions that have not competed
successfully in this arena recruit star faculty who have strong track records
obtaining NIH funding. They each invest in laboratories and programmes to
increase their health-related research. However, the number of such faculty is
limited and competitor institutions often try to recruit the same small group
of stellar faculty, creating bidding wars over salary and laboratories, each
requiring an investment. To gain an advantage, institutions end up
outspending each other. By doing so, they cancel out each other's investments,
and are often unable to recoup dollars spent.
Such behaviour creates an "arms race" among contestants. The stakes
are simply raised and to outpace competitors requires outspending them. The
result is that all contestants run harder to stay in place and those that choose
not to play the game quickly slip behind. Frank and Cook argue that ending an
arms race is difficult without externally mandated agreements. However,
when some universities did attempt to agree upfront on fmancial aid packages
so that they would not compete for students using financial aid, the US Justice
Department intervened, filing an anti-trust suit (Frank and Cook, 1995).
The above dynamics help illuminate why US colleges and universities
seem obsessed with media rankings as they strive for prestige and position
near the top of the relative standings. To increase their rankings, institutions
shape and re-shape institutional behaviour and priorities to improve their
placement (Ehrenberg, 2002). Several scholars (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997;
Marginson and Considine, 2000) argue that, in higher education, status is an
even more important goal in institutional decision making than money.
Enhancing prestige in the "winner-take-all environment" opens possibilities.
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Reputation and prestige bring with them public awareness and recognition,
and opportunities and associations that otherwise might not be available to
lower-status institutions (Ehrenberg, 2002).
Tensions between public interest and the competitive marketplace
Fiscal situations, demographic swings, new state policies, and the rules
and dynamics ofthe winner-take-all competitive environment create difficult
and competing pressures for college and university leaders. On the one hand,
they work to position their institution in the competitive environment, but on
the other hand they are trying to meet public purposes that may not have
much value in the marketplace, but which are essential to a functioning
democracy. To be sure, competition in higher education is not always a
negative force. As in other knowledge sectors, such as information technology,
health care and consulting, competition has the potential to drive down costs,
increase innovation and access, and improve quality (Porter and Teisberg,
2004). However, competition in higher education seems to be creating as many
problems as it solves. The cumulative effect of competition may work against
important social objectives, particularly access and affordability. Examples
include offering institutional aid to highly sought-after students who could
afford tuition rather than to students in need, building new state-of-the-art
athletic facilities rather than revitalising the campus library, and investing in
one set of academic programmes that have strong ties to the market place
(e.g. executive Master of Business Administration programmes) while allowing
a different set to starve on the vine (e.g. geography or hearing and audiology).
In the United States, historically, public policy objectives have included
the trilogy of affordability, access and quality. Given economic trends in
various states, many university leaders and policy makers are adding
economic development as a fourth policy priority. However, the demands of
the competitive marketplace push leaders to pursue strategies that generate
revenue, maximise prestige to generate future opportunities, increase the
attractiveness of their institution, enhance research capacities and promote
quality. All the while, students and families, potential corporate partners and
faculty become savvy consumers and exploit choices.
Although both sets of objectives include "quality", that concept has
different meanings depending on which side of the ledger one is looking at.
Quality in the pubhc purpose domain typically concerns itself with outputs
and addresses issues related to undergraduate programmes, such as the
ability of graduates to find meaningful employment and function well as
citizens, and the production of well-prepared graduates to address state-wide
needs (e.g. nursing shortages). Quality in the competitive arena is often
heavily focused on input measures and may be concerned as much with
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graduate and professional education as undergraduate education. In the
competitive arena, quality often encompasses the abilities of researchers to
attract federal and private grants and contracts, or the status and star
credentials of faculty. In some ways these two types of quality overlap, but
they also contain some incongruities.
Competing differently
Competition among colleges and universities is not going to diminish;
and, if anything, indicators suggest it will continue to intensify. Thus, might it
be shaped to advance more positive ends, particularly the public policy
objectives of affordability, access and quality?
Competition can be viewed as multi-dimensional. What organisations
compete over and the ways they compete are various elements that might be
altered to improve practice, reason Michael Porter and Elizabeth Teisberg in
the Harvard Business Reuieiu (2004). Focusing on health care, they argue that
that sector might compete differently and by doing so would make marked
improvements in public concerns of health care cost, accessibility and quality.
They suggest that if health care competition focused on driving down costs,
raising productivity and improving service quality with the intention of
creating a healthy society - patient by patient and disease by disease - it
would not be in its current troubled state. They suggest that instead health
care's current form of competition makes it more expensive, limits access and
patient choice, and hampers innovation and quality. Comparisons between
health care and higher education are not uncommon, and they share the same
policy concerns of affordability, quality and access. Following Porter and
Teisberg's argument for health care, are colleges and universities competing
over the wrong things that bring about undesirable effects? How might a
different approach to competition work to improve higher education,
particularly to lower costs, improve quality and expand access, while
addressing the realities ofthe winner-take-all environment?
Improving health care via competition
Porter and Teisberg say that, currently, competition in health care takes
place at the wrong level, with the wrong objectives, in the wrong forms and
geographic markets, with the wrong strategies and structures, marked by the
wrong information, and with the wrong incentives for the participants. Many
of these ideas might be relevant to higher education.
* The Wrong Level: Competition takes place at the level of health plans and
hospitals, not at the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of individual
health concerns. The authors cite studies that show that when teams of
physicians treat a high volume of patients with a particular condition, they
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create better outcomes and lower costs. They further suggest that costs and
quality can be improved when organisations prevent errors, boost efficiency
and develop expertise, which occurs through specialisation and focus.
® The Wrong Objectiue: The primary objective of health care competition is to
reduce costs - not the overall costs of care, but predominately those bome by
health plans and employers. The objective instead should be to improve the
quality of health outcome per dollar spent at the disease and treatment level.
@ The Wrong Forms of Competition: Instead of competing on the individual
condition level. Porter and Teisberg suggest that health care has four
unhealthy kinds of competition:
• Competition each year for health plans to sign up subscribers, which
limits competition at the disease level because of network restrictions
and creates a short-term mindset.
• Providers compete to be included in particular networks by giving deep
discounts to large plans. It does not cost less to treat someone employed
by a large company than someone who is self-employed.
• Providers compete to be the largest, most powerful group offering the
largest array of services to develop their bargaining clout. Hospital
mergers create redundancies, not synergies.
• Providers and payers shift costs to each other rather than work to lower
costs or improve services. Payers raise rates on those who become ill;
patients seek coverage for procedures not included (such as cosmetic
surgery); and employers allow plans to deny coverage to employees.
O The Wrong Geographic Market: Because health care competition is local,
providers are insulated from successes of others and the spread of best
practices is impeded. Because most health care plans have high out-of-
network costs, people are deterred further from seeking the best care
elsewhere. Although people will still predominately visit their local doctors,
those with complex or uncommon conditions may benefit from service
available elsewhere.
© The Wrong Strategies and Structures: Although value is increased by deep
expertise and tailored facilities, write Porter and Teisberg, health care
instead pursues strategies that broaden services and expand capacities.
Mergers and consolidations create conglomerations that stifle competition.
(The authors do not mention if these larger structures facilitate
communication and the transfer of best practices, something they argue
elsewhere in the article is important.)
© The Wrong In/ormation: Information allows people to shop for the best value
and forces providers to compare themselves. The information in health care
is about plan coverage and participant satisfaction, not about providers'
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expertise and outcomes for treatments. Little information exists about how
many patients with a particular diagnosis a provider has treated. Although
difficult to collect, the authors note that some small-scale experiments in
which a preponderance of information is readily available have lowered
costs and improved performance.
• The Wrong Incentiues: Finally, Porter and Teisberg suggest that the wrong
incentives exist for both payers and providers. Insurers, they argue, should
be rewarded for helping their customers learn about and obtain the best
health care; for simplifying administrative processes; and for making
participants' lives easier. Currently, payers benefit by enrolling healthy
people and raising costs (or denying coverage) for those who are sick. They
complicate billing and dispute payments, shifting costs to providers and/or
patients. They restrict access to expensive treatments and out-of-network
care, as providers have incentives to make referrals in their own network.
Reimbursement practices encourage physicians to spend less time with
patients and then readmit them if there is a continuing problem.
Redefining competition in higher education
The ideas put forth by Porter and Teisberg raise interesting questions
regarding competition in US higher education. By redefining the particular
dynamics of competition, it might be possible to reduce some tensions
regarding higher education's rising costs and challenges of access, particularly
for low-income students.
First, is it possible for institutions to compete over costs that are
transparent? Students and their families, like all consumers, are cost-
conscious. They look to maximise the investment of their tuition dollars,
while maximising their returns. However, the actual cost to attend college for
students often is different from the posted tuition and fees (i.e. true costs
uersus"sticker price"). Institutions offer many students discounts on tuition
(sometimes deep discounts) as enticements to enrol, and use fmancial aid
packages to recruit particularly desired students.
Second, how do current operationalised definitions of quality affect
competition? Students and their families seek the highest quality institution.
Yet, quality is often defined with little attention to how much students leam
or the impact of the students' education on their personal, professional and
civic lives. Instead, quality is represented by surrogates that may not be
illustrative of a student's experience, such as the student-faculty ratio, per
student expenditures, reputation among peer institutions or the number of
internship experiences available. What other indicators of quality might
better help students make wise choices in where they enrol at either the
institution or academic programme level?
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Third, is the right information available to help students make wise
choices? The difficulty in addressing the first two points above is that students
and their families lack relevant information to make meaningful
comparisons. Finances are opaque at best and are moving targets, and quality
is unclear. Regarding quality, prospective students often rely on rankings in
the popular media, such as the US News & World Report, that may reveal little
of the quality of education a student receives. However, because these
rankings influence student choice, institutions continue to participate in
them, and engage in strategies that may move them up in the rankings but do
little to affect the actual experiences of students (Ehernberg, 2002). The
National Survey of Student Engagement is a relatively new yardstick that may
eventually supplant popular press rankings; however, as of yet its information
about each specific institution typically is controlled by that institution, not
allowing for comparisons between institutions. Furthermore, the likelihood of
a single source or standard of information adequately capturing the quality of
a student's experience at the diversity of institutions is slim at best. Too many
variables - including, but not limited to the student's background and
objectives, institutional mission, and differences in majors and academic
programmes - are involved to take on this matter lightly. And comparisons
between unlike institutions may downplay the strengths of some that might
add tremendous value to a particular student's experience. Not all students
seek the same thing from a higher education, nor should all institutions
provide the same thing.
Fourth, how might institutions, and in turn students, benefit from
specialisation and not breadth? Porter and Teisberg suggest that value is
increased by expertise and tailored facilities, and costs go down and quality
increases through specialisation and practice. While certain colleges or
universities may offer niche programmes or pursue niche missions, the
current environment encourages institutions to compete on breadth of
programmes. Most end up having a broad array of academic majors that are
the same if not similar to those offered by their competitors. In many ways,
expectations of what is essential to a university demand this. Can a research
university really be an outstanding research university without an
undergraduate history programme or a physics department? What happens if
other such programmes of higher "quality" (however defined) exist locally? (Of
course the realities of closing academic programmes are a completely
different and difficult challenge [see Eckel, 2003].)
On a related point, what might be the implications if colleges and
universities competed at the individual course level instead of competing on
the whole academic programme or undergraduate experience? With distance
learning and refined transfer and articulation agreements, students can now
make decisions to enrol in an institution on almost a course-by-course basis.
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Institutions might pursue increased speciahsation and expertise in certain
majors or even at the course level. On one level, institutions would find this
level of competition troublesome, as institutions try to steal away their
students on a course-by-course basis. However, from another perspective,
such expertise might allow institutions to make investments in particular
areas, as others would provide the broader course coverage.
Competition for the most part is taking place on a local level, but how
might distance learning alter the geographic landscape? Today's students,
unless highly mobile, typically choose between institutions in a particular
region, although the size of their region may vary (i.e. all institutions in a
particular city or all liberal arts colleges in two neighbouring states). However,
distance learning creates the possibility of making geographic location in
some cases irrelevant.
Finally, what would be the implications of alternative incentives for
institutions that placed a high value on educational outcomes, student
learning, serving low-income students or preparing graduates for pressing state
needs? Current incentives encourage institutions to invest in amenities (among
other things) that appeal to talented and often wealthier students, such as new
residence halls or recreational facilities, which may increase costs and do little
for quality. Scathing critiques such as the article in the New York Times titled,
"Jacuzzi U?" (Winter, 2003), or efforts by four Texas universities to build climbing
walls higher than one another (McCormick, 2005) are symptomatic of the
situations institutions find themselves facing. The difficulty of changing
incentives in the winner-take-all market is that no single competitor (or even
small group of competitors) has the ability to alter incentives without risking
becoming irrelevant given the current rules of the game (Frank and Cook, 1995).
Instead, an outside agency must create and enforce an "arms reduction
agreement", as is the case in professional sports and other similar competitive
environments.
Conclusion
Competition in US higher education is much more complex than
discussed here (see for example, Ehernberg, 2002; Frank and Cook, 1995;
Winston, 2003). This paper does not attempt to be comprehensive. Instead, it
simply seeks to approach the issue through a different perspective and
provoke higher education leaders and observers to think in other ways about
competition and how tensions between being successful in the winner-take-
all higher education arena and meeting public purpose objectives might be
mediated before we create a situation too difficult to alter constructively.
At a recent conversation on competition, market pressures and public
purposes, college and university presidents got no further in broaching
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solutions. They readily acknowledged the changing environment and the
challenges of meeting public purposes at a time of declining public resources
and increased competition that often reward priorities and choices
inconsistent with public objectives. Some of the presidents believed that
competition can and should be altered to be more constructive, but others did
not agree. As one president said, "If students want climbing walls, let them
have the damn climbing walls.", only to be countered by another president
who said, "I get concerned when competition takes resources away from
something important, when the climbing wall takes resources away from
class size". The conversation remains unfinished.
Finally, meaningful change will require challenging changes throughout
the sector to occur. And given the current dynamics in US higher education,
those best positioned to lead such change are the very same institutions that
are benefiting the most from the current system of competition.
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